Shannon Nason's Website

Area of Specialization: Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy

Area of Competence: Ancient Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, History of Modern Philosophy, Metaphysics,
Aesthetics

My current research is primarily in nineteenth-century philosophy, particularly the thought of Kierkegaard. I integrate
systematic concerns in philosophy of religion and metaphysics into my work. My dissertation focuses on Kierkegaard's
theory of change and activity. I am presently writing about the notions of contingency and necessity in Kierkegaard's
philosophy and their relationship to contemporary metaphysics and Leibniz's possible-worlds metaphysics, in addition to
issues surrounding the debate about libertarianism and determinism and its application to divine and human freedom.
Because Hegel is an important point of critical contact for Kierkegaard on these issues, my recent writings develop
Kierkegaard's theory of freedom in light of his objections to Hegel's idealism. My current research serves my long term goal
to develop a systematic account of Kierkegaard's philosophy of freedom and action in the context of historical and
contemporary philosophical debates about these issues. I also maintain research interests in the status of metaphysics and
the scope of "epistemic humility" in Kant's pre-critical and critical writings, and how Kant's transcendental idealism may
have positive bearing on our understanding of Kierkegaard's division between faith and reason and his arguments against
natural theology.

Some recent work:

Draft of "Contingency, Necessity, and Causation in Kierkegaard's Theory of Change," British Journal for the History of
Philosophy (conditionally accepted; currently completing requisite revisions)
In this paper I argue that Kierkegaard's theory of change is motivated by a robust notion of contingency. His view of
contingency is sharply juxtaposed with a strong notion of absolute necessity. I show that how he understands these notions
explains certain of his claims about causation. I end by suggesting a compatibilist interpretation of Kierkegaard's
philosophy.

Draft of "Opposites, Contradictories, and Mediation in Kierkegaard's Critique of Hegelianism," The Heythrop Journal
(forthcoming)
In this paper I argue that Kierkegaard endorses Hegel's theory of mediation, the view that relative opposites are mediated.
However, I show that Kierkegaard denies Hegel's thesis that there are all and only relative opposites. I develop two of his
arguments against this thesis. The first is existential. This argument comes from the dramatic interplay between A, the often
disagreable aesthete of Either/Or I, and Judge William, the dutiful ethicist of Either/Or II. Judge William convincingly
argues that the possibility of future aiming human projects is rendered obsolete if aesthetic and ethical forms of existence
are mediated opposites. The second is philosophical. This second argument is offered by Johannes Climacs in Concluding
Unscientific Postscript. I show that Climacus issues a reductio argument that I call "the argument from insufficient difference."

Draft of "Why Does Kierkegaard Say that the Necessary is not Possible?"
In this short paper I consider Kierkegaard's apparently false remark that the necessary is not possible. With some effort I
think we can process what Kierkegaard means if we focus on the immediate context of his remark. His statement emerges
out of a discussion about the nature of 'the change of coming into existence.' In Aristotelian fashion, Kierkegaard defines
the change of coming into existence as a 'transition from possibility to actuality.' Kierkegaard presses on the more or less
uncontroversial point that any change is contingent and not absolutely necessary. I suggest that Kierkegaard's view about
the contingency of change drives the initially embarrassing remark that the necessary is not possible. While he is mistaken, I
show that his claim coheres with his driving concern to sharply distinguish the absolutely necessary from contingency.

Draft of "On Kierkegaard's Distinction Between Change and Activity" (in preparation for publication)
In this paper I argue that Kierkegaard, like Aristotle, employs an important distinction between two notions of
change--kinetic change and non-kinetic change. I show that this distinction is played out as Kierkegaard's authorship
advances from his ealier pseudonymous writings to his later personally signed and religous writings. Whereas the aesthetic
and dialectical writings of his pseudonmous authorship are concerned with the kinetic change the self undergoes as it
attempts to move to more intense forms of subjective inwardness, his religious works underscore the importance of the
activity of being a self at each moment in time. I argue that activity is non-kinetic because it meets three important
conditions offered by Aristotle in Metaphysics Theta: (1) rather than being a transition from possibility to actuality, the
activity of being a self preserves possibility at every moment; (2) rather than being a process over time, the activity of being
a self is synchronic; and (3) rather than being directed at an end outside of itself, the activity of being a self is its own end.