Dorothea K Herreiner, Economics Department, Loyola Marymount University
Abstract:
We consider several bargaining experiments in which players determine an allocation of
four indivisible goods. We show that the bargaining dynamics are relevant for the choice of
a specific allocation. For instance, it matters for the agreement who first proposes a specific
allocation - an "unequal" allocation is significantly more likely to be accepted if suggested by the
disadvantaged person. We also show that non-binding communications influence the outcome of the game.
We derive similar results with complete and incomplete information and compare them to a
dictator-version of our experiments where no bargaining or communication is possible. Procedural
aspects of free-form bargaining are shown to matter.
Keywords: Bargaining, Fairness
JEL Classification: C790, C910, D630
Current Version: June 2005.
An earlier version circulated under the title "Who Said It First? Procedural Aspects of Experimental Bargaining Games".