Research

1. Voting Behavior

Healy, Andrew and Neil Malhotra. “Citizen Competence and Democratic Accountability: Voter Responses to Naturdal Disaster Relief and Preparedness Spending” (revise and resubmit at the American Political Science Review)

Abstract: Using comprehensive data on natural disasters, government spending, and election returns, we show that voters reward disaster relief spending but not disaster prevention spending. This aspect of voter behavior creates a large distortion in the incentives that governments face, since the results demonstrate that prevention spending substantially reduces future damage. Even in their responses to disaster relief, voters do not effectively hold governments accountable for their actions, since they reward relief spending that is unrelated to disaster damage similarly to spending that is actually prompted by damage. While the results illustrate multiple failures in voters’ abilities to hold governments accountable, they also suggest that grass-roots efforts may help voters to reward government action that increases public welfare. Voters responded significantly to one particular disaster prevention program that emphasized communication and community involvement, behavior that stands in stark contrast to the ambivalence that voters display for prevention spending in general.

What the blogs have to say: NY Times' Freakonomics blog; EconLog; In Case of Emergency

Cole, Shawn, Andrew Healy, and Eric Werker. “Do Voters Appreciate Responsive Governments? Evidence from Indian Disaster Relief” (revise and resubmit at the Journal of Development Economics )

Abstract: Using rainfall, public relief, and election data from India, we examine how governments respond to adverse shocks and how voters react to these responses. The data show that voters punish the incumbent party for weather events beyond its control. However, we find evidence that fewer voters punish the ruling party when the party responds vigorously to the crisis. Moreover, severe crises are associated with increased voter sensitivity to disaster assistance. These results provide an explanation for Amartya Sen’s claim that democratic governments respond better to salient emergencies than to less conspicuous ones. Even so, most responses to most crises leave the incumbent coalition worse off than had it not been in power during a crisis at all.

2. Experimental and Behavioral Economics

Healy, Andrew. “How Effectively Do People Learn from a Variety of Different Opinions?” (supported by Russell Sage) (revise and resubmit at Experimental Economics)

Abstract: This paper presents experimental evidence about how individuals learn from information coming from heterogeneous sources. In the experiment, Thai subjects observed information that came from Americans and other Thais that they could use to help them answer a series of questions. Despite listening too little to either group, subjects demonstrated a significant amount of statistical sophistication in how they weighed observed American information relative to observed Thai information. The data indicate that subjects understood that outside information has extra value because people from the same group tend to make the same kinds of mistakes. The results illustrate the importance of forming diverse groups to solve problems.

Healy, Andrew. “Do Firms Have Short Memories? Evidence from Major League Baseball” (forthcoming, Journal of Sports Economics)

Abstract: When deciding what salary to offer an employee, a firm needs to predict that employee’s future productivity. One piece of information that a firm can use to predict productivity is the employee’s past performance record. Classical theory predicts that firms will effectively use the available information to choose an appropriate salary offer. Evidence from baseball contracts indicates, however, that memory-based biases influence salary offers. Consistent with insights from psychology and behavioral economics, salaries are affected too much by recent performance compared to past performance. All organizations do not suffer equally from short memories. The teams that achieve the most with the money that they spend also use past performance data most effectively.

3. Other published papers

Healy, Andrew and Jitsuchon, Somchai (2007). “Finding the Poor in Thailand,” Journal of Asian Economics, 18(5): 739-59.

Abstract: We provide the first comprehensive estimates of Thai poverty and inequality at levels below the changwat (province). We do this by combining a household survey, which has income and consumption data, with the 2000 Census, which is representative at the level of the individual. To improve the precision of our estimates, we propose improvements to the methods previously applied in other settings. We produce estimates that correspond closely to those produced by the survey alone at the province level. In addition to passing this test, the standard errors on the district-level estimates of poverty and inequality are actually smaller than the changwat-level estimates that come from the household survey. We conclude by demonstrating the potential for this spatial decomposition to improve policy. If policymakers want to reduce the poverty gap, our results can help direct resources in a much more effective way than was previously possible.

Wantchekon, Leonard and Andrew Healy (1999). “The ‘Game’ of Torture,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43(5): 596-609.

Abstract: The authors explain the prevalence of torture by modeling its institutional structure as a game of incomplete information involving the state, the torturer, and the victim. Once the state endorses torture as a mechanism for extracting information, its will is carried out with positive probability. This is because (a) even a "soft" and "sensitive" state agent might torture the victim to test his or her ability to resist and (b) a weak victim might hold out momentarily to find out whether the torturer is sensitive or "sadistic." When the state uses torture to intimidate political opposition, all types of torturers will behave sadistically. As a result, torture becomes more widespread and more cruel. The authors explain why a "culture" of individual resistance is the only effective solution to torture.

4. Research in progress

"Euphoria and Retrospective Voting: The Effect of College Football Outcomes on Incumbent Re-election" (with Neil Malhotra and Cecilia Mo)

"Weather, Tornadoes, and Elections: Random Events and Voter Response" (with Neil Malhotra)

"Individual Unemployment, Layoffs, and Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections"

"Do More Knowledgable Voters Make Better Decisions?"

"Cost Asymmetry and Incomplete Information in the Volunteer's Dilemma" (with Jennifer Pate, supported by Russell Sage)

"Competition, Teams, and Gender" (with Jennifer Pate)